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Abstract
Let a0 = a ∈ N, {Mi}∞i=1 be an infinite set of integers and {b1, b2, . . . , bk} be a finite set of integers. We say that {ai}∞i=0
is a pseudo-recursive sequence if an+1 = Mn+1an + bjn+1 (bjn+1 ∈ {b1, b2, . . . bk}) holds. In the first part of the paper, we
investigate the subset sum of a generalized version of Aα := {an = b2nαc : n = 0, 1, 2, . . . }, which is a special pseudo-
recursive sequence. In the second part, we use Aα for an encryption algorithm.
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1. Introduction
Let α ∈ R, 1 ≤ α < 2, be any real number and consider the sequenceAα := {an = b2nαc : n = 0, 1, 2, . . . }. This sequence was
advised by Re´nyi and was used by Erdo˝s to investigate some geometric configuration in Hilbert spaces [3]. If we express α
in base 2, α = 1.ξ1ξ2 . . . , (ξi ∈ {0, 1},
∑
i(1− ξi) =∞), then one can see {an} as a pseudo-recursive sequence satisfying the
identity
an = 2an−1 + ξn; n ≥ 1. (1)
Generally, let a0 = a ∈ N, {Mi}∞i=1 be an infinite set of integers and {b1, b2, . . . bk} be a finite set of integers. We say that
{ai}∞i=1 is a pseudo-recursive sequence if the identity
an+1 = Mn+1an + bjn+1
holds, where bjn+1 ∈ {b1, b2, . . . bk}) for n ≥ 0. One of the aims of this paper is to investigate subset sums of a more general
pseudo-recursive sequence which was induced by a sequence of Cantor.
The set of subset sums of Aα is defined for 1 ≤ α < 2, by
P (Aα) :=
{ ∞∑
i=0
εiai : ai ∈ Aα; εi ∈ {0, 1} for all i;
∑
i
εi <∞
}
. (2)
This set is related to the binary representation of integers (see related results in [4]).
Cantor advised a representation of all non-negative real numbers in the form
x = bxc+
∞∑
i=1
ηi(x)
q1q2 · · · qi ,
where bxc is the integer part of x, qi ≥ 2 are integers (i = 1, 2, . . . ), 0 ≤ ηi(x) < qi are the ‘digits’ and there are infinitely
many i for which ηi(x) < qi− 1 holds (see [2]). The related general radix representation of a non negative integer N is also
due to Cantor: let M1,M2, . . . be an infinite sequence of integers with Mi ≥ 2, (i = 1, 2, . . . ) then
N = a1 + a2M1 + a3M1M2 + · · ·+ an+1M1M2 · · ·Mn,
where 0 ≤ ai ≤Mi − 1.
The generalized Re´nyi type sequence would be the following: let {qi}∞i=1 be an infinite (and fixed) sequence of integers
with qi ≥ 2 (i = 1, 2, . . . ) and let Qn :=
∏n
i=1 qi, Q0 := 1. Represent any α, 1 ≤ α < 2 in base {qi}∞i=1 and take
Aα = {an = bQnαc : n ∈ N}.
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We can define a set for the subset sums of this generalized Aα in a similar way as we did in (2):
R(Aα) :=
{ ∞∑
i=0
εiai : ai ∈ Aα; εi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , qi+1 − 1} for all i;
∑
i
εi <∞
}
. (3)
In some cases we will use the finite version of this, where the summation goes from 0 to n and we denote it byR({a0, a1, . . . , an}).
In Section 3 we will show that the elements of R(Aα) also fulfil some pseudo-recursive identity, and in our argument we
analyze the structure of the set R(Aα).
In Section 4, we discuss an encryption algorithm, based on the set of subset sums of Aα := {an = b2nαc : n = 0, 1, . . . }.
The coding process briefly is the following (see Section 4 for more details).
Let cn = ξ1ξ2 . . . ξn be the n digit codeword, that Alice wants to send to Bob. Alice chooses α to have the following form
in base 2: α = 1.ξ1ξ2 . . . ξn . . . (she can extend arbitrarily).
Alice and Bob previously agree on a secret key γ, 0 < γ < 1. The encrypted (and public) message will be an integer N
which is sent by Alice to Bob. She calculates this N in a way to ensure that γN falls in a certain ‘gap’ of P (Aα).
We will enable everyone to ask about elements of a set S ⊆ [1, N ] of integers , which is defined by α (see Section 4). Take
the a query function f : [1, N ] 7→ {0, 1}, f(x) = 0, if x 6∈ S and f(x) = 1, if x ∈ S. Everyone can query an (x0, x0 +1, . . . x0 +L)
sequence of integers such that (f(x0), f(x0 + 1), . . . , f(x0 + L))=(0, 0, . . . , 0, 1). So, we can query x0 and if it is not in S we
can query x0 + 1 and so on until we find an element of S or we reach N + 1.
In Section 4, we will prove that Bob can find out the message with about log2N queries and that an eavesdropper cannot
do better, than a cN
log22N
long query sequence on average.
2. Notation
For the sets A,B ⊂ N, the sum (difference) is defined by A ± B := {a ± b : a ∈ A; b ∈ B} and the restricted sum of these
two sets is defined as AuB := {a+ b : a ∈ A; b ∈ B; a 6= b}.
For a finite and non empty set X = {x1 < x2 < · · · < xr}(⊂ N), the length of the biggest gap is
∆X = max{t ∈ N : ∃yt ∈ X; x1 ≤ yt < xr; [yt + 1, . . . , yt + t] ∩X = ∅},
(if such t does not exist, then ∆X = 0). So, essentially we have ∆X = max1≤i<r(xi+1−xi)−1. We say that [y∆X +1, y∆X +∆X ]
(or if ∆X = 0, the empty set) is the biggest gap. If we fix X then we write briefly ∆ instead of ∆X .
Throughout the paper, log2N will denote the logarithm in base 2.
3. The structure of R(Aα)
In this section, we are going to investigate the structure of the set R(Aα). Here we shall use the notation given just before
equation (3), so 1 ≤ α < 2 is written in base {qi}∞i=1, Q0 = 1, Qi =
∏n
i=1 qi and Aα = {an = bQnαc : n ∈ N}. Let ηn denote
the n’th digit of α in the Cantor type representation. Firstly, we show that the elements of Aα ensure a pseudo-recursion.
Theorem 3.1. For every n ≥ 0, the pseudo-recursion
an+1 = qn+1an + ηn+1
holds.
Proof. Write
Qnα = Qn + η1
Qn
q1
+ η2
Qn
q1q2
+ · · ·+ ηn Qn
q1q2 · · · qn + ηn+1
Qn
q1q2 · · · qnqn+1 + . . .
= Qn + η1
Qn
q1
+ η2
Qn
q1q2
+ · · ·+ ηn Qn
q1q2 · · · qn +Hn.
Since Qj =
∏j
i=1 qi, thus the fractions
Qn
q1
; Qnq1q2 ; . . . ;
Qn
q1q2···qn = 1 are integers. Now, we show that Hn < 1 and hence
an = bQnαc = Qn + η1Qn
q1
+ η2
Qn
q1q2
+ · · ·+ ηn−1 Qn
q1q2 . . . qn−1
+ ηn. (4)
Indeed simplifying in Qn, we obtain
Hn = ηn+1
1
qn+1
+ ηn+2
1
qn+1qn+2
+ . . . ,
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ηr ≤ qr − 1 for r ≥ n+ 1, and there exists an s for which the inequality is strict, so we obtain
Hn ≤ (qn+1 − 1) 1
qn+1
+ (qn+2 − 1) 1
qn+1qn+2
+ · · ·+ (qs − 2) 1
qn+1 · · · qs + . . .
≤ 1− 1
qn+1 · · · qs < 1.
(5)
Now Qn+1 = Qn · qn+1, so multiplying (4) by qn+1, we get
qn+1an = Qn · qn+1 + η1Qn · qn+1
q1
+ η2
Qn · qn+1
q1q2
+ · · ·+ ηn · qn+1.
Now if we rewrite (4) with n+1 instead of n and we subtract the previous expression from it we get that an+1−qn+1an = ηn+1,
as we wanted.
Proposition 3.1. Let N(n) :=
n∑
i=0
(qi+1 − 1)ai. The set R(Aα) ∩ [0, N(n)] is symmetric with respect to the middle point, i.e.
R(Aα) ∩ [0, N(n)] = N(n)− (R(Aα) ∩ [0, N(n)]).
Proof. Pick an element x fromR(Aα)∩[0, N(n)]. The element x can be written as x =
∑n
i=0 εiai, ai ∈ Aα, εi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , qi+1−
1}. Now,
y = N(n)− x =
n∑
i=0
(qi+1 − 1)ai −
n∑
i=0
εiai =
n∑
i=0
(qi+1 − 1− εi)ai =
n∑
i=0
ε′iai
where ε′i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , qi+1 − 1} which implies that y ∈ R(Aα)∩ [0, N(n)]. When x ∈ N(n)− (R(Aα)∩ [0, N(n)]) the argument
is the same.
Proposition 3.2.
R(Aα) ∩ [an, an+1) =
qn+1−1⋃
k=1
{kan + (R(Aα) ∩ [0, an))}.
Moreover,
|R(Aα) ∩ [0, an)| = qnqn−1 · · · q1
i.e. each member of the set R(Aα) has a unique representation.
Proof. Since an+1 = qn+1an + ηn+1, it follows an+1 ≥ qn+1an = (qn+1 − 1)an + an and hence, by induction,
an+1 ≥
n∑
i=0
(qi+1 − 1)ai + a0. (6)
Now by (6),
R(Aα) ∩ [an, an+1) =
qn+1−1⋃
k=1
{kan, kan + a0, · · · · · · , kan + (q1 − 1)a0, kan + a1, · · · , kan + (q1 − 1)a0 + (q2 − 1)a1, · · ·
· · · , kan + (q1 − 1)a0 + · · ·+ (qn − 1)an−1} =
qn+1−1⋃
k=1
{kan + (R(Aα) ∩ [0, an))}.
So,
|R(Aα) ∩ [an, an+1)| = (qn+1 − 1)|R(Aα) ∩ [0, an)|.
It follows that
|R(Aα) ∩ [0, an)| = 1 +
n∑
i=1
|R(Aα) ∩ [ai−1, ai)| = 1 + (q1 − 1) + (q2 − 1)(1 + (q1 − 1)) + · · ·
= qnqn−1 · · · q1,
which can be easily seen by induction.
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Corollary 3.1. Let R(Aα) = {0 = r0 < r1 < r2 < · · · }. For any index k, let
(i) k = knqn−1 · · · q1 + kn−1qn−2 · · · q1 + · · ·+ k2q1 + k1, 0 ≤ ki ≤ qi − 1, kn 6= 0.
Then
(ii) rk = knan−1 + kn−1an−2 + · · ·+ k2a1 + k1a0.
Conversely, if a = knan−1 + kn−1an−2 + · · ·+ k2a1 + k1a0 ∈ R(Aα), then
a = rknqn−1···q1+kn−1qn−2···q1+···+k2q1+k1 .
Proof. We can easily see that the function f from N to R(Aα) which carries k ∈ N (given in the form (i)) to the element
given in the form as in (ii) is strictly increasing (by (6) from the previous proof) and surjective. The converse direction
follows from that it is exactly the inverse function of f .
Proposition 3.3. Let ∆k be the length of the biggest gap of Bk := R(Aα) ∩ [1, ak]. Then the sequence {∆k}nk=1, n ≥ 2 forms
an increasing sequence. Moreover
∆k =
k∑
j=1
ηj (7)
and the corresponding sequence to the biggest gap is
∑k−1
i=0 (qi+1 − 1)ai + 1, . . . , ak − 1.
Proof. We use induction on k. Firstly, we remark that for any n:
R({a0, a1, . . . , an}) = R({a0, a1, . . . , an−1}) + {jan : j = 0, . . . , qn+1 − 1}. (8)
Now, look at the case k = 1:
B1 = {a0 = 1, . . . , (q1 − 1)a0, a1}
so the lengths of the gaps are 0s and (a1 − (q1 − 1)a0)− 1. Now a1 = q1a0 + η1 (by Theorem 3.1), thus (a1 − (q1 − 1)a0)− 1 =
η1 = ∆1 and the corresponding sequence is (q1 − 1)a0 + 1, . . . , a1 − 1 or ∅. So for k = 1 the statement is true.
Assume now that (7) is true for k ≥ 1. Now, by (8) and the inductive hypothesis in the intervals [(j − 1)ak, jak],
1 ≤ j ≤ qk+1 − 1 the biggest gap is ∆k. Using Theorem 3.1 and the inductive hypothesis again in the last interval
[(qk+1− 1)ak, ak+1] the biggest gap is ∆k + ηk+1 and the corresponding sequence is
∑k
i=0(qi+1− 1)ai + 1, . . . , ak+1− 1, which
proves the proposition.
4. Encryption using the set Aα uAα
Now, we are ready to analyze our encryption scheme, which was introduced in the end of Section 1. Before the theorems,
we shall repeat the process here in a bit more detail.
Let cn be the binary codeword (the message) with n digits: cn = ξ1ξ2 . . . ξn. Alice chooses α for the message cn such that
α = 1.ξ1ξ2 . . . ξn . . . in base 2 (she can extend arbitrarily after ξn, the only assumption is that the digit 0 appears infinitely
many times). We will use the set Aα := {an = b2nαc : n = 0, 1, 2, . . . } and the set of its subset sums P (Aα) defined in (2).
Since it is a special case of the generalization we investigated in the previous section (namely qi = 2 for all i) we can use
those results here.
Alice and Bob previously agree on the secret key γ, 0 < γ < 1. Alice chooses a random integer N ∈ [
∑n−1
i=0 ai+1
γ ,
an
γ ). The
encrypted message (the ciphertext) will be this integer N , which is sent by Alice to Bob.
Let S be the set given by
S := (Aα uAα) ∩ [1, N ]. (9)
The set S is available to everyone via a query sequence: Let us define the function f : [1, N ]→ {0, 1}, f(x) = 0, if x 6∈ S and
f(x) = 1, if x ∈ S. Everyone can query an (x0, x0 + 1, . . . x0 +L) sequence of integers such that (f(x0), f(x0 + 1), . . . , f(x0 +
L))=(0, 0, . . . , 0, 1). So we can query x0 and if it is not in S we can query x0 + 1 and so on until we find an element of S. The
length of the query sequence is Lα(N, x0) := L.
Firstly, we prove the following:
Theorem 4.1. If Alice sends the message N , for which
γN ∈ [
n−1∑
i=0
ai + 1, an) (10)
holds, then Bob can get the message by asking a query sequence with length Lα(N) ≤ log2N + 2.
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Proof. Write α = 1 +
∑
i ξi2
−i which is now hidden and we are interested in an = b2nαc. Note that Aα u Aα ⊆ P (Aα), i.e.
we can use the structure of P (Aα). Let R = bγNc. Due to the choice of N , R is in the biggest gap of P ({a0, . . . , an}). Thus
the smallest number which is at least R and belongs to this subset sum is just an, and hence an + a0 = an + 1 is the first
element of Aα uAα, which is at least R.
So the query sequence of Bob should be (x0 = R,R+ 1, . . . , R+ L). By Proposition 3.3 we get that
L ≤ an + 1−
n−1∑
k=0
ak = ∆n + 2 =
n∑
k=1
ξk + 2.
Since for every k, ξk ≤ 1, thus L ≤ n + 2 ≤ log2N + 2. So the length of Bob’s query sequence is at most log2N and the
element he finds at the end is an + 1. From this Bob can easily get cn, since an has the form of an = 1ξ1ξ2 . . . ξn.
Let Eve be an eavesdropper (a passive attacker; i.e. she can catch the encoded ciphertext and also can ask a query
sequence). We are interested in how long Eve needs to query on average to find an element of S. The appropriate mathe-
matical phrasing would be the following:
After we fixed the secret key γ and N (the encrypted message), enumerate the elements of S:
S := {s1 < s2 < · · · < sk} and let X be the random variable which says that how long Eve needs to query if she picks one
element of [1, N ] uniformly at random. More precisely, if n ∈ [1, N ], then X(n) := the length of the query sequence started
at n. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 4.2. The expected length of query sequence of an eavesdropper Eve, who chooses the start of the query sequence
uniformly at random in [1, N ] is
E(X) ≥ cN
log22N
, (11)
(c > 0 absolute).
Proof. First, we calculate the expected value of a query sequence, assuming that the first number Eve asked is in a fixed
gap. We introduce the following events:
B0 := {the number n, that Eve chose is in [1, s1)}
Bk := {the number n, that Eve chose is in [sk, N ]}
and for i = 1, . . . , k − 1:
Bi := { the number n, that Eve chose is in [si, si+1)}.
Note that the previously defined events form a complete system of events. For 1 ≤ i < k, by the decoding scheme, we get
that:
E(X | Bi) = 0 · 1
si+1 − si + (si+1 − (si + 1)) ·
1
si+1 − si + (si+1 − (si + 2)) ·
1
si+1 − si + · · ·+ 1 ·
1
si+1 − si =
si+1 − si − 1
2
and with the same argument it is easy to see that E(X | B0) = s12 and E(X | Bk) = N−sk2 . With the help of the law of total
expectation we get:
E(X) =
k∑
i=0
P(Bi)E(X | Bi) = s1
N
· s1
2
+
k−1∑
i=1
si+1 − si
N
· si+1 − si − 1
2
+
N − sk + 1
N
· N − sk
2
≥
≥ s
2
1
k + 1
· k
2N
+
k−1∑
i=1
(si+1 − si − 1)2
k + 1
· k
2N
+
(N − sk)2
k + 1
· k
2N
≥
≥ k
2N
(s1 + k−1∑
i=1
(si+1 − si − 1) + (N − sk)
k + 1
)2
=
k
2N
(N − k + 1
k + 1
)2
≥ (N − k + 1)
2
8kN
where in the second inequality we used the Cauchy inequality. It is easy to see that |Aα ∩ [1, N ]| ≤ c′ logN . Further we
have that S = (Aα uAα) ∩ [1, N ] and the representations of the elements in Aα uAα is unique, since we have seen that in
P (Aα) the representation is unique, and AαuAα ⊆ P (Aα). So we get that k ≤ c′′ log22N , which gives the desired result.
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5. Concluding remarks
1. Against an eavesdropper we shall restrict the length of the query sequence by Nβ (for some parameter β). This way it
is possible to ensure that Eve cannot be sure about the right codeword even if she finds an xL relatively quickly.
If Eve (the eavesdropper) finds an xL after a query sequence, then she has to find α with the information she got so far.
How can she do that? She knows that she found an element of Aα u Aα so she tries to decompose xL as a sum of b1 and
b2 where one of them is the prefix of the other one in base 2 (because they should both have the form of b2iαc). Seemingly
there can be many decompositions, but Eve can eliminate some of these by doing the following: take b′1 and b′2 such that
b′1 =
⌊
b1
2j
⌋
, b′2 =
⌊
b2
2l
⌋
and b′1 > b′2. If bi really has the form b2iαc then b′1 + b′2 is in S. So if Eve has queried b′1 + b′2 (and got 0
as an answer) then b1 and b2 is not the correct decomposition. If this is not the case, namely for all b′1 and b′2 the sum b′1 + b′2
was not queried, then we call this b1, b2 pair acceptable for Eve. With the restriction on the length of the query sequence we
have a result about the number of acceptable decompositions for Eve. Namely even if she manages to find an xL quicker
than Nβ , she has at least c log2N acceptable b1, b2 pairs (where c is a constant).
2. We learnt in section 4 that Bob has to know and keep as a secret for decoding the parameter γ. Since the bound N
for the query sequence always varies, hence for eavesdropper has no chance to detect the value of γ, i.e. Bob can use this
parameter without restriction.
3. Results in cryptography has a long list. Interestingly (by the knowledge of the authors) papers which relate to subset
sums are few (see e.g. [1,5]). Although the general knapsack problem is known to be NP–complete.
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